As Manila navigates a shifting security landscape, strengthening alliances with Japan and Australia becomes crucial to counter China's maritime ambitions
The Philippines' alliance with the US has been the foundation of its external defense posture for decades. It is operationalized on paper through the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and the Visiting Forces Agreement. Over the years, the country has expanded its defense cooperation engagements, which are now complemented by the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement with Australia and the Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan.
One way for the PH-US alliance and other partnerships to enhance the country's credible deterrence posture is through the conduct of multilateral exercises such as Balikatan, Kamandag, and Salaknib, as well as air and cyber drills -- all designed to enhance the interoperability of their combined forces. Other means could include the periodic rotation of troops participating in training activities and the limited prepositioning of their equipment.
The country is also an ASEAN member state and part of various security-related multilateral undertakings. The ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting-Plus is a confidence and trust-building mechanism between member states, their dialogue partners, and observer states. In terms of maritime security cooperation, it is part of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement INDOMALPHI that combats armed robbery at sea in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, the Information Fusion Centre, and the ReCAAP facility, both based in Singapore, as well as other ASEAN-led mechanisms focused on non-traditional security concerns.
Despite all these interlocking security engagements, the frontline view from Manila paints a starker picture of the region.
Beijing has already established effective sea control of the South China Sea, and to some extent, even in the East China Sea. Certainly, its gray-zone tactics have effectively reshaped facts on the water without triggering open conflict. But other factors were at play: the lack of collective and unilateral will among affected states to challenge China's coercive actions at sea, and the imbalance of naval power in East Asia.
In the latter case, the decline in the US Navy's battle force since 2015 was in contrast to the efficacy of China's shipbuilding industry that allowed the PLA-Navy, the Chinese Coast Guard, and the militia vessels to grow in the last ten years. This enabled them to surge and swarm in large numbers in any part of the South China Sea. Moreover, its navy and fishing fleets have already ventured out towards the Arctic, the mid-Pacific, the Americas, and the far reaches of the Indian Ocean.
While China is expanding its global influence, the US under President Trump seems keen on withdrawing from the great game in the Indo-Pacific.
Politico reported that a draft US National Defense Strategy is considering a retreat from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, focusing inward on domestic security concerns and reclaiming its military preeminence in the Americas.
If this shift transpires, it will compel its allies and partners to take up the cudgels arising from a power vacuum and hold the line in their respective fronts.
The US remains a staunch ally of the Philippines, while ASEAN still holds a symbolic weight despite its shortcomings. However, minilateral arrangements are now proving more operationally decisive for the government. Flexible and mission-driven coalitions are expected to deliver tailored responses to maritime and hybrid threats. Hopefully, there is still a sweet spot wherein it can work with a broader Southeast Asian consensus and respond swiftly alongside the US and key partners to deter China or manage a crisis in the WPS.
Among the minilaterals sans US involvement, the one involving the Philippines, Japan, and Australia might be the most promising.
First, this "trilateral arrangement" shares similar challenges. Geo-strategically, they should deter an assertive China encroaching on their respective waters. Geo-economically, they have to find ways to sustain economic development through open markets while using economic tools for strategic ends. Geo-politically, they need to contest Chinese disinformation and influence to protect their liberal-democratic values.
Second, these countries could cooperate on common areas of concern: These could be achieved through intelligence-sharing, a coordinated approach to countering Chinese disinformation, cyber defense, or joint naval patrols in the South China Sea. In terms of economic measures, they can compare respective advantages for joint development in areas such as defense, electronics, mining, and food security. They can align economic security policies to diversify their supply chains and reduce reliance on China. Diplomatically, they can coordinate their efforts at international forums to amplify a values-based vision for regional order.
Third, a new "Manila Pact" could be reestablished with the three countries serving as the "regional hub" of a maritime defense and security regime, employing the following strategic approaches:
The Pact could expand northward, with the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan forming an ad hoc single theater organization. They could agree on a common archipelagic defense posture, employing a 'sea denial strategy' along the East and South China Seas and a 'sea control strategy' for the straits and restricted channels. For the Philippines, the challenge is how to deter China now, rather than waiting for a Taiwan crisis to happen and get enmeshed in a political dilemma in the future.
Deterrence in this case requires fortifying the defenses in the northern provinces, particularly in the Batanes Group of Islands. This should be complemented by acquiring capabilities to deny the PLA Navy control of the Bashi Channel and Luzon Strait and developing the infrastructure and support mechanism to handle non-combatant evacuation at the port of Aparri.
The Pact could also expand westward, linking the Philippines, Australia, and Vietnam. The three countries can cooperate in joint naval patrols, coast guard exercises, and maritime domain awareness exchanges in the South China Sea. Moving further westward, Japan and Australia could cooperate with India in various types of naval and military activities in the Indian Ocean and in the waters near the Malacca Strait.
Lastly, it could consider an eastward focus, with Japan and Australia, and France engaging Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, and the independent Pacific island states. These countries can collaborate on maritime security concerns, such as fisheries patrols and maritime domain awareness programs, and countering Chinese influence operations.
China is interested in establishing a presence in these areas, particularly those that hosted US and Japanese bases during World War II. It is also important for the Philippines that Beijing does not expand its sphere of influence in the region beyond its successful foothold in the Solomon Islands, to avoid being encircled between the first- and second-island chains.
In summary, the regional security landscape is in flux. The Philippines needs to work in a concert of middle powers to navigate the emerging security challenges, accommodate in its calculations possible deficits in our alliance with the US, and build a national will to defend its interests from China's ambition. - Rappler.com